Have You Updated Your Toaster? Transatlantic Approaches to Governing the Internet of Everything by Shackelford, Scott J. & Bradner, Scott O.
Hastings Law Journal 
Volume 72 Issue 2 Article 4 
2-2021 
Have You Updated Your Toaster? Transatlantic Approaches to 
Governing the Internet of Everything 
Scott J. Shackelford 
Scott O. Bradner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott J. Shackelford and Scott O. Bradner, Have You Updated Your Toaster? Transatlantic Approaches to 
Governing the Internet of Everything, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 627 (2021). 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol72/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship 




Have You Updated Your Toaster? Transatlantic 
Approaches to Governing the Internet of 
Everything  
SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD† & SCOTT O. BRADNER† 
As Internet-connected devices become ubiquitous, it remains an open question whether security—
or privacy—can or will scale, or whether a combination of perverse incentives, new problems, 
and new impacts of old problems like “technical debt” amassing from products being rushed to 
market before being fully vetted, will derail progress and exacerbate cyber insecurity. This Article 
investigates contemporary approaches to Internet of Things (IoT) governance through an in-
depth comparative case study focusing on the European Union (EU) and the United States. 
Particular attention is paid to the impact on IoT security of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and the Network Information Security (NIS) Directive in the EU, and the 
influence of the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework 
(NIST CSF), with a focus on mitigating the risk of politically motivated attacks on civilians. We 
analyze reform proposals and apply lessons from major prior Internet governance debates to 
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INTRODUCTION 
There were more than 2.9 billion cyber attacks on Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices in 2019, which works out to a 300-percent increase from 2018, resulting 
in damages measured in the billions.1 Regardless of the specific number, such a 
vast scale of Internet-connected devices opens up a host of both business 
possibilities and security vulnerabilities. One such example of a potentially 
dystopian IoT future came in 2016 when a distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attack, which came to be known as the Mirai botnet,2 crashed servers managed 
by Dyn, a leading tech firm that manages certain critical Internet services, 
resulting in service disruptions. The botnet took advantage of IoT 
vulnerabilities,3 but instead of a foreign nation state, it turned out that the 
perpetrators were three college students trying to win at Minecraft.4 “They didn’t 
realize the power they were unleashing,” according to FBI agent Bill Walton.5 
“This was the Manhattan Project.”6  
This episode highlights the myriad vulnerabilities underlying the Internet’s 
architecture that politically motivated nation-states can leverage to achieve their 
strategic ends, such as undermining trust in an adversary government by causing 
civil unrest following a blackout.7 During the 2018 Black Hat cybersecurity 
conference, for example, ninety-three percent of respondents “saw the future of 
IoT not necessarily as something smarter, but more dangerous, as they predict 
nation states will target or exploit connected devices in droves over the coming 
year.”8  
The advent of Internet-connected vehicles and appliances has the capacity 
to revolutionize business and society.9 But the vast majority of IoT devices are 
 
 1. Zak Doffman, Cyberattacks on IOT Devices Surge 300% in 2019, ‘Measured in Billions’, Report 
Claims, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2019, 2:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/09/14/dangerous-
cyberattacks-on-iot-devices-up-300-in-2019-now-rampant-report-claims/#7771c6758926. 
 2. See Neena Kapur, The Rise of IoT Botnets, AM. SEC. PROJECT (Jan. 13, 2017), 
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-rise-of-iot-botnets/ (“A bot is defined as a computer or internet-
connected device that is infected with malware and controlled by a central command-and-control (C2) server. A 
botnet is the term used for all devices controlled by the C2 server, and they can be used to carry out large scale 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against websites, resulting in an overload of traffic on the website 
that renders it unusable.”). 
 3. See Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things Is Far Bigger Than Anyone Realizes, WIRED, 
https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); Lawrence J. 
Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 347–48 (2015). 
 4. Garrett M. Graff, How a Dorm Room Minecraft Scam Brought Down the Internet, WIRED (Dec. 13, 
2017, 3:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/mirai-botnet-minecraft-scam-brought-down-the-internet/. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. This episode is analyzed in greater detail in SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: 
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2020). 
 7. See Charlie Osborne, The Future of IoT? State-Sponsored Attacks, Say Security Professionals, ZDNET 
(Aug. 13, 2018, 7:15 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-future-of-iot-state-sponsored-attacks-say-
security-professionals/. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Chris Welch, Tesla’s Model S Will Add Self-Driving ‘Autopilot’ Mode in Three Months, VERGE 
(Mar. 19, 2015, 12:41 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/3/19/8257933/tesla-model-s-autopilot-release-date. 
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far smaller and cheaper—security cameras, baby monitors, kids’ toys, doorbells, 
and even devices implanted in our own bodies, along with building controls, 
down to individual light bulbs. However, it remains unclear whether security—
and privacy—can or will scale along with this increasingly crowded and 
interconnected marketplace or whether a combination of perverse incentives, 
increasing complexity, and new impacts of old problems like the “technical 
debt” amassing from products being rushed to market, or simple ignorance of 
security fundamentals on the part of manufactures or users, will derail progress 
and exacerbate prevalent cyber insecurity.10 This is a particular problem for 
governments seeking to protect vulnerable IoT devices and networks in an array 
of critical infrastructure contexts, including healthcare and the electric grid, from 
foreign exploitation.11 
The Mirai botnet episode noted above highlights the complexities involved 
in managing the multi-faceted cyber threat facing the public and private sectors. 
IoT botnets are concerning given that they provide state and non-state actors 
alike—including cybercriminals, politically motivated hacktivists, kids playing 
around, and nation-states12—asymmetric capabilities that can be used to target 
intellectual property and critical infrastructure. An array of public-private 
efforts, such as the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Cybersecurity Framework, efforts by civil society, such as the Consumer 
Reports Digital Standard, and national governments, such as the United 
Kingdom’s Cyber Essentials Plus Certificate discussed in Parts II and III, are all 
being pursued to help harden the IoT. But will they be enough? What are the 
benefits and drawbacks of the various private and public IoT governance models 
being pursued by the EU and United States?13 How much convergence is there 
among approaches purporting to govern the IoT, and what does that portend for 
the future of impacted industries and consumers, particularly given concerns 
over deepening digital divides driven in part by debates over 5G deployment?14  
This Article focuses on cybersecurity standards set by industry, national 
governments, and international organizations, to make networks and network-
connected devices more secure against hackers in general and, in particular, 
against politically motivated attacks by foreign governments, or their proxies. 
 
 10. This is an industry term for the legacy costs of rolling out new products without first improving 
security. See Taylor Armerding, What Is Security Debt, and How Do I Get Out of It?, SYNOPSYS (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/security-debt/; see also Technical Debt, TECHOPEDIA, 
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/27913/technical-debt (Mar. 20, 2017). 
 11. See Osborne, supra note 7. 
 12. Jason Kornwitz, Why Politically Motivated Cyberattacks Might Be the New Normal, PHYS.ORG (June 
30, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-06-politically-cyberattacks.html (“[W]e’ll ‘certainly see more and more 
nation-state malware cropping up as cyberspace becomes more militarized as a way to achieve geopolitical 
goals.’”). 
 13. China is another important epicenter for IoT governance but is not analyzed here due to space 
constraints. See, e.g., Pan Qi, China IoT Standards to Go Global, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 4, 2018), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/jiangsu/wuxi/2018-01/04/content_35441064.htm. 
 14. See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, The Splinternet Is Growing, FORTUNE (May 29, 2019, 3:30 AM), 
https://fortune.com/2019/05/29/splinternet-online-censorship/. 
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Such issues are at the forefront of both international business and geopolitics, 
with escalating tensions between the United States and Iran being a case in point 
of the stakes and vulnerabilities involved.15 We investigate contemporary 
approaches to IoT security through an in-depth comparative case study focusing 
on the European Union (EU) and the United States, the first time that this has 
been attempted in the literature from a national security perspective.16 Particular 
attention is paid to the impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
and the Network Information Security (NIS) Directive in the EU, the influence 
of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and other leading technical standards 
and risk management strategies like cyber risk insurance, with a focus on 
mitigating the risk of politically motivated attacks.17 We analyze transatlantic 
reform proposals and apply lessons from major Internet governance debates to 
argue for a polycentric approach to boosting IoT securing across both 
jurisdictions. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I introduces the topic with a brief 
history of the Internet of Things before moving on to reviewing prominent 
technical vulnerabilities and use cases, the argument over whether there is 
currently a market failure in the IoT context, and what role cyber risk insurance 
may play in mitigating it. Part II then focuses on the U.S. approach to IoT 
governance, paying particular attention to the federal regulatory landscape and 
relevant state initiatives along with the role played by civil society. Part III then 
analyzes EU efforts at IoT cybersecurity in some detail, paying particular 
attention to GDPR and including a national case study in the form of the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the impact of Brexit on its cybersecurity efforts. Part IV then 
 
 15. Cf. Jacquelyn Schneider, It’s Time to Calibrate Fears of a Cyberwar with Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/opinion/iran-cyber-attack-hacking.html (making the case that 
large-scale cyber attacks on the United States from Iran are more difficult than is often reported). 
 16. Cf. Jane E. Kirtley & Scott Memmel, Rewriting the “Book of the Machine”: Regulatory and Liability 
Issues for the Internet of Things, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 455, 458–59 (2019) (surveying the field of IoT 
security with a focus on liability); Jenna Lindqvist, New Challenges to Personal Data Processing Agreements: 
Is the GDPR Fit to Deal with Contract, Accountability and Liability in a World of the Internet of Things?, 26 
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 45, 59–61 (2018) (surveying GDPR as it applies to IoT governance with a particular 
focus on liability); Mauricio Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues for Business, 
43 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 68 (2016) (offering a speculative account of the impact of GDPR on IoT governance); 
Michael L. Rustad, How the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation Will Protect Consumers Using Smart 
Devices, 52 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 227, 244 (2019) (focusing on the impact of GDPR on consumer-focused IoT 
cybersecurity from an EU perspective); Jeremy Siegel, When the Internet of Things Flounders: Looking into 
GDPR-esque Security Standards for IoT Devices in the United States from the Consumers’ Perspective, 20 J. 
HIGH TECH. L. 189, 194–95 (2020) (analyzing how GDPR would apply to IoT cybersecurity in the U.S. context); 
Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the 
Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87, 130–31 (2019) (taking a high-level view of IoT governance 
with an emphasis on the emerging role of AI). 
 17. Of particulate note is the July 16, 2020 ruling from the European Court of Justice that found Privacy 
Shield unconstitutional, impacting the transatlantic data governance regime but upholding standard contractual 
clauses. As of this writing, the European Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce have begun a new 
round of negotiation to replace Privacy Shield with a new regime consistent with the July 2020 ECJ ruling. 
Natasha Lomas, EU-US Privacy Shield Is Dead. Long Live Privacy Shield, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 11, 2020, 2:21 
AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/11/eu-us-privacy-shield-is-dead-long-live-privacy-shield/. 
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summarizes policy implications both by applying lessons from the case studies 
to create an original spectrum of IoT governance by relying on lessons from the 
field of polycentric governance, and also taking lessons from the history of 
Internet governance and applying them to hot topics in IoT security including 
the emerging norm of cybersecurity due diligence.  
I.  WELCOME TO THE INTERNET OF EVERYTHING 
It remains unclear where exactly the term “Internet of Things” (IoT) 
originated,18 though it is without question that the term today is widely used to 
refer generally to a host of efforts to make our governments, businesses, and 
even our bodies, increasingly interconnected and hence, to some degree, 
“smart.”19 It features a wide range of products that “can be monitored, 
controlled[,] and linked”20 together. Yet the positive press from such devices can 
hide their direct and indirect costs,21 including the possibility of using them in 
situations of domestic abuse.22 Moreover, public awareness of IoT remains low. 
One survey, for example, found that only twenty-five percent of respondents 
could define the “Internet of Things.”23 The decision to purchase a smart speaker 
or doorbell, for example, is rarely situated as part of a larger framework about 
the vulnerabilities it could introduce both personally, as well as in the wider 
community, similar to how many of us do not connect the use of disposable bags, 
or mining bitcoin, to marine or air pollution.24 And for those who are in the 
trenches, it is not uncommon for “cyber fatigue” to set in. James Lewis of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, has said, “[w]e have 
a faith-based approach [to cybersecurity], in that we pray every night that 
 
 18. Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009), 
www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986. 
 19. See, e.g., Meghan Neal, The Internet of Bodies Is Coming, and You Could Get Hacked, VICE (Mar. 13, 
2014, 11:20 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvyqgm/the-internet-of-bodies-is-coming-and-you-could-
get-hacked; Hung LeHong & Jackie Fenn, Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2011, GARTNER (July 28, 
2011), https://www.gartner.com/doc/1754719/. 
 20. Bonnie Cha, A Beginner’s Guide to Understanding the Internet of Things, VOX (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:00 
AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/1/15/11557782/a-beginners-guide-to-understanding-the-internet-of-things. 
 21. See Aaron Tilley, How Hackers Could Use a Nest Thermostat as an Entry Point into Your Home, 
FORBES (Mar. 6, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2015/03/06/nest-thermostat-hack-
home-network/#235d0d693986; Carl Franzen, How to Find a Hack-Proof Baby Monitor, LIFEHACKER (Aug. 4, 
2017, 6:30 PM), https://offspring.lifehacker.com/how-to-find-a-hack-proof-baby-monitor-1797534985; Charlie 
Osborne, Smartwatch Security Fails to Impress: Top Devices Vulnerable to Cyberattack, ZDNET (July 22, 2015, 
10:25 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/smartwatch-security-fails-to-impress-top-devices-vulnerable-to-
cyberattack/; John Markoff, Why Light Bulbs May Be the Next Hacker Target, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/technology/why-light-bulbs-may-be-the-next-hacker-target.html. 
 22. See Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (June 
23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/smart-home-devices-domestic-abuse.html. 
 23. Infographic: IoT Awareness Is Low but Adoption Continues to Grow, IOT TIMES (June 20, 2019), 
https://iot.eetimes.com/infographic-iot-awareness-is-low-but-adoption-continues-to-grow/. 
 24. See IoT Is Coming Even if the Security Isn’t Ready: Here’s What to Do, WIRED, 
https://www.wired.com/brandlab/2017/06/iot-is-coming-even-if-the-security-isnt-ready-heres-what-to-do/ (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
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nothing bad will happen.”25 In short, managing the growth of IoT impacts a 
diverse set of interests from national security to economic competitiveness, 
sustainable development, and trust in the digital age. How did we get here? 
A.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The notion of deploying and leveraging the power of smart devices has 
been a goal decades in the making. Such “intelligent” devices were envisioned 
as far back as the 1950s and 1960s.26 This trend continued during the creation of 
ARPANET, an undertaking that eventually became what we refer to as the 
Internet, under the heading of “pervasive computing.”27 For example, Carnegie-
Mellon University researchers in the 1980s deployed sensors in a vending 
machine.28 By the 1990s, even though the Internet was increasingly global, slow 
connection speeds held back IoT devices and services.29  
The potential of IoT tech has arguably only been realized since 2010,30 the 
result of the confluence of at least three factors: (1) the widespread availability 
of always-on high-speed Internet connectivity in many parts of the world; (2) 
faster computational capabilities permitting the real-time analysis of Big Data; 
and (3) economies of scale lowering the cost of sensors and chips to 
manufacturers.31 However, the rapid rollout of IoT technologies has not been 
accompanied by any mitigation of the array of technical vulnerabilities across 
these devices, which are introduced next.  
B.  TECHNICAL VULNERABILITIES AND USE CASES 
As has often been observed, the Internet was not designed with security in 
mind.32 Access to the early ARPANET was restricted to government-funded 
 
 25. Ken Dilanian, Privacy Group Sues to Get Records About NSA-Google Relationship, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
14, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-sep-14-la-fi-nsa-google-20100914-
story.html. 
 26. See NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 71 (2010). 
 27. LeHong & Fenn, supra note 19. 
 28. The Internet of Things: Groundbreaking Tech with Security Risks, WELIVESECURITY (Oct. 29, 2015, 
12:49 PM), http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/10/29/internet-things-groundbreaking-tech-security-risks/ 
(“Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University first came up with an internet-connected Coke vending machine 
in 1982.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Steve Ranger, What Is the IoT? Everything You Need to Know About the Internet of Things 
Right Now, ZDNET (Feb. 3, 2020, 6:45 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/what-is-the-internet-of-things-
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-iot-right-now/. 
 30. See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things’, FORBES (May 13, 2014, 12:05 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-
can-understand/. 
 31. See JIM CHASE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS, TEX. INSTRUMENTS (2013), 
www.ti.com/lit/ml/swrb028/swrb028.pdf; Scott J. Shackelford, Anjanette Raymond, Danuvasin Charoen, 
Rakshana Balakrishnan, Prakhar Dixit, Julianna Gjonaj, & Rachith Kavi, When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric 
Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things”, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 422 (2017). 
 32. Craig Timberg, A Flaw in the Design, WASH. POST (May 30, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/05/30/net-of-insecurity-part-1/. 
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researchers and, even after more than a decade, fewer than a thousand computers 
were connected to it.33 With a limited and controlled set of users, security was 
not considered an important issue. Thus, the underlying architecture and 
protocols of the Internet do not have security “built-in.”34  
Because the network itself does not provide adequate security protections, 
security is left to the devices connected to the network, which are often not up 
to the task. This includes toasters, which in many ways have become the 
quintessential example of an Internet-connected device that, perhaps, should not 
be.35 Former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, for example, has 
warned about the vulnerabilities in various IoT devices, including toasters, to be 
utilized by intelligence agencies around the world to aid surveillance efforts.36 
Too many device or software vendors have been slow to understand that it is the 
vendor’s job to provide security in the systems they sell. For example, it was not 
until early 2002 that Microsoft, the primary vendor of operating system software 
for Internet-connected devices, made security a primary goal.37 To this day, far 
too many medical devices have inadequate security.38 Industrial controllers are 
often vulnerable because vendors incorrectly assumed they would only be used 
on isolated networks, not the Internet.39 Too many IoT toys and devices, such as 
security cameras and baby monitors, have fixed and unchangeable access 
passwords which, when (not if) discovered, open the devices to exploitation.40 
This is now easily done by making use of websites such as Shodan, which can 
allow anyone (hackers and defenders alike) to search for IoT devices connected 
to the Internet.41 Many IoT devices are built using embedded computing 
modules that were programmed by component manufacturers who, 
 
 33. Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline, ZAKON, https://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ 
(Jan. 1, 2018). 
 34. Timberg, supra note 32. 
 35. See Alex Hern & Arwa Mahdawi, Beware the Smart Toaster: 18 Tips for Surviving the Surveillance 
Age, GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/28/beware-the-smart-
toaster-18-tips-for-surviving-the-surveillance-age. 
 36. See Steve Ranger, Yes, Your Smart Toaster Really Will Be Spying on You for the Government, ZDNET 
(Feb. 12, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/yes-your-smart-toaster-really-will-be-spying-on-you-
for-the-government/ (“In the future, intelligence services might use the IoT for identification, surveillance, 
monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.”). 
 37. Bill Gates, Bill Gates: Trustworthy Computing, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2002, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2002/01/bill-gates-trustworthy-computing/. 
 38. Lily Hay Newman, Medical Devices Are the Next Security Nightmare, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:30 
AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/; Scott J. Shackelford, Michael 
Mattioli, Steve Myers, Austin Brady, Yvette Wang, & Stephanie Wong, Securing the Internet of Healthcare, 19 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 405 (2018); Kelly Sheridan, Severe Vulnerabilities Discovered in GE Medical Devices, 
DARK READING (Jan. 23, 2020, 1:40 PM), https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/severe-
vulnerabilities-discovered-in-ge-medical-devices/d/d-id/1336867. 
 39. Robert Abel, Researchers Find 147 Vulnerabilities in 34 SCADA Mobile Applications, SC MEDIA (Jan. 
11, 2018), https://www.scmagazine.com/the-top-security-weaknesses-were-code-tampering-flaws-which-were-
found-in-94-percent-of-apps/article/736656/. 
 40. Anna Bryk, IoT Toys: A New Vector for Cyber Attacks, APRIORIT (Feb. 2, 2018, 7:18 PM), 
https://www.apriorit.com/dev-blog/521-iot-toy-attacks. 
 41. See SHODAN, https://www.shodan.io/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
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demonstrably, have little to no security expertise.42 Moreover, even more 
sophisticated firms have run into trouble. Amazon’s Ring smart doorbell, for 
example, has been the subject of a federal class action investigation after 
breaches due to alleged lax security such as a lack of multi-factor 
authentication.43 This begs the question of whether or not there is a market 
failure when it comes to IoT security. 
C.  AN IOT MARKET FAILURE?  
Debates have played out for years over whether or not there is a market 
failure in the cybersecurity context generally, or in IoT specifically.44 Market 
failures occur when price mechanisms fail to take account of the relevant “costs 
and benefits necessary to provide and consume a good,”45 such as when the stock 
prices of firms are not negatively impacted following a data breach even as their 
customers and employees suffer.46 Relatedly, as applied to IoT, Yosef 
Yudborovsky has argued, “[t]he security failure at the heart of IoT is a product 
of the lack of incentives owners see in defining the software to provide its 
maximum security.”47 In short, such a limited perspective can result not only in 
more frequent exploitations and data breaches, but also in perpetuating identity 
theft and potentially exacerbating national security concerns. A future could play 
out wherein some consumers who can afford the added cost are able to enjoy the 
benefits of more secure (and thereby private) devices, whereas others who are 
less well-off are forced to rely on insecure products.  
There are important ethical and legal implications of such an IoT market 
failure worth exploring. For example, under a utilitarian framing, the costs to 
society generally are high in a hyper-connected IoT ecosystem powering a 
surveillance economy in which a reasonable expectation of personal privacy 
becomes technically impossible, in either public or private settings.48 There are 
 
 42. Darren Allan, Dangerous Backdoor Exploit Found on Popular IoT Devices, TECHRADAR (Mar. 2, 
2017), https://www.techradar.com/news/dangerous-backdoor-exploit-found-on-popular-iot-devices. 
 43. E.g., Amazon’s Ring Slammed with Federal Lawsuit, CISO MAG. (Dec. 30, 2019), 
https://www.cisomag.com/amazons-ring-slammed-with-federal-lawsuit/ (“According to researchers, the 
vulnerability stems from when the Ring smartphone app sends the wireless network connections to the Amazon 
Ring servers in the cloud. It’s found that this process is taking place in an insecure manner, which can be 
exploited by an attacker.”). 
 44. See Eli Dourado, Is There a Cybersecurity Market Failure? 19–33 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus 
Ctr., Working Paper No. 12-05, 2012), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Cybersecurity_Dourado_ 
WP1205_0.pdf (arguing that market failures are not so common in the cybersecurity realm); Jerry Brito & Tate 
Watkins, Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy, 3 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 39, 82 (2011) (making the case against there being a cybersecurity market failure). 
 45. Introducing Market Failure, LUMEN LEARNING: BOUNDLESS ECON., https://courses.lumen 
learning.com/boundless-economics/chapter/introducing-market-failure/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 46. See Shinichi Kamiya, Jun-Koo Kang, Jungmin Kim, Andreas Milidonis & René M. Stulz, What Is the 
Impact of Successful Cyberattacks on Target Firms? 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24409, 
2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24409/w24409.pdf. 
 47. Yosef Yudborovsky, The Failure in the Market for the Internet of Things, MEDIUM (June 27, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@yoss202/the-failure-in-the-market-for-internet-of-things-cff948f571b9. 
 48. SHACKELFORD, supra note 6, at ch. 4.   
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several ways to leverage the market to avoid such an Orwellian outcome, some 
of which are explored in Parts II through IV. For example, civil society may be 
leveraged to better inform consumers about the security traits of the products 
they are considering (such as the Consumer Reports Digital Standard). IoT 
trustmarks and certification schemes may be utilized to a similar end. IoT 
product manufacturers may also be compelled to internalize the costs of their 
insecure products, as seen in California and the EU.49 More generally, firms 
could recognize IoT security not only as a necessary cost of doing business, but 
as a corporate social responsibility.50 
Regrettably, we shall see the U.S. government has been slow to address the 
situation despite occasional calls for a “shared responsibility” in promoting 
cybersecurity.51 As a result, these devices have been left open to exploitation, 
necessitating a new approach to IoT governance that would include a role for 
insurance as part of a larger polycentric approach to securing IoT. 
D.  CONSIDERING A ROLE FOR INSURANCE 
Interconnected devices have the potential to drive numerous new 
businesses, and even industries, but they also contribute to our collective cyber 
insecurity. An increasingly popular tool to help mitigate the risk of cyber attacks 
is insurance, with total global premiums being on the order of $20 billion by 
2025.52 The value of the U.S. market alone for cyber risk insurance is expected 
to surpass $3 billion by 2025, with more than 40% of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), and greater than 60% of large enterprises, having cyber risk 
coverage in 2019.53 Target, for example, was able to recover $44 million from 
its insurance carrier following its massive data breach in 2013–2014.54 Indeed, 
a growing number of public sector stakeholders—including local governments 
and even state agencies—are purchasing cyber risk insurance policies to help 
mitigate the risks they face.55 
However, there are myriad problems associated with cyber attacks that 
insurance is either ill-suited or unable to help manage. For example, it has long 
been the case that it is difficult to purchase insurance coverage for trade secrets, 
impacts on brand or reputation following a data breach, or other hard-to-quantify 
 
 49. See infra Parts II–IV.  
 50. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort & Danuvasin Charoen, Sustainable 
Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1995 (2016). 
 51. Rand Beers, Cybersecurity: A Shared Responsibility, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 18, 2013, 1:33 PM), 
https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2013/10/18/cybersecurity-shared-responsibility. 
 52. Jennifer Rudden, Cyber Insurance—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/topics/2445/cyber-insurance/. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Dhanya Skariachan & Jim Finkle, Target’s Cyber Insurance Softens Blow of Massive Credit Breach, 
INS. J. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/02/26/321638.htm. 
 55. See, e.g., Scott Ikeda, Cyber Insurance Now Critical for Public Sector Agencies?, CPO MAG. (Nov. 
29, 2017), https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/cyber-insurance-now-critical-public-sector-agencies/. 
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costs.56 This fact is problematic given that the vast majority of the firms 
comprising the S&P 500 are tied up in intangible assets, namely intellectual 
property.57 Moreover, numerous organizations that think they are covered for a 
given cyber incident have found out otherwise in the aftermath of a breach given 
how these policies can be written with exclusions for various first- and third-
party losses, not to mention acts of cyber war and terrorism.58 For the latter, as 
of this writing Maersk is litigating with its insurance carrier over whether or not 
the $1.3 billion in losses it sustained in June 2017 is covered by its insurance 
policy given that it was likely Russia’s military intelligence agency behind the 
breach.59 This facet of many existing policies limits the utility of cyber risk 
insurance to help mitigate the risk of politically motivated cyber attacks utilizing 
IoT vulnerabilities.  
Indeed, IoT is challenging for cyber risk insurance providers on several 
fronts, including the fact of how difficult it is to quantify the risk given how 
many of these smart products lack “even basic . . . security features . . . such as 
updates and patches.”60 Adding this to the fact that cyber attacks on IoT devices, 
such as pacemakers or furnaces, can have real-world and even life-threatening 
impacts means that more people, and organizations, will see this as vital to 
mitigating cyber risks.61 However, building actuarial tables to better understand 
the IoT cyber threat landscape is no simple matter given the relative lack of 
verifiable data.62 Clearly, then, IoT cyber risk insurance coverage will be an 
increasingly popular, if still incomplete and problematic, component of a 
polycentric approach to managing the full range of cyber threats threating 
individuals, organizations, and nations. 
E.  A POLYCENTRIC APPROACH TO SECURING IOT 
Of the many ways to consider cybersecurity policy in the IoT context, 
among the most potentially helpful is arguably polycentric governance. As has 
 
 56. See, e.g., Christine Marciano, Trade Secrets Are Not Covered by Cyber Insurance, DATA BREACH INS. 
(Feb. 21, 2013), https://databreachinsurancequote.com/cyber-insurance/trade-secrets-are-not-covered-by-cyber-
insurance/. 
 57. See Bruce Berman, $21 Trillion in U.S. Intangible Assets Is 84% of S&P 500 Value—IP Rights and 
Reputation Included, IP CLOSEUP (June 4, 2019), https://ipcloseup.com/2019/06/04/21-trillion-in-u-s-
intangible-asset-value-is-84-of-sp-500-value-ip-rights-and-reputation-included/. 
 58. See Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Risky Business: Lessons for Mitigating Cyber Attacks from 
the International Insurance Law on Piracy, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–3 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford, Should 
Your Firm Invest in Cyber Risk Insurance?, 55 BUS. HORIZONS 349, 353–54 (2012). 
 59. See Riley Griffin, Katherine Chiglinsky & David Voreacos, Was It an Act of War? That’s Merck Cyber 
Attack’s $1.3 Billion Insurance Question, INS. J. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/ 
news/national/2019/12/03/550039.htm (noting that the real targets behind NotPetya were in Ukraine and Maersk 
was “collateral damage”). 
 60. MARSH & MCLENNON COS., THE INTERNET OF EVERYTHING: BUILDING CYBER RESILIENCE IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 2 (2018), https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/research/building-cyber-resilience-in-a-
connected-world.html (select “view full article”).  
 61. See id. at 3–5.  
 62. See Doffman, supra note 1. 
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been previously argued, this framework “is a multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-
functional, and multi-sectoral model”63 that “challenges orthodoxy [in part] by 
demonstrating the benefits of self-organization [and] networking regulations ‘at 
multiple scales.’”64 Polycentricity also argues for a set of nested stakeholders 
rather than “a single governmental unit,” which is often unable to address 
“global collective action problems”65 such as cyber-attacks in the IoT context. 
This approach, in other words, “recognizes both the common but differentiated 
responsibilities of public- and private-sector stakeholders as well as the potential 
for best practices to be identified and spread organically, generating positive 
network effects that could, in time, result in the emergence of a cascade toward 
a cybersecurity due diligence norm.”66  
Elinor Ostrom’s seminal book Governing the Commons offered a series of 
eight design principles distilled from her extensive fieldwork for the effective 
management of common pool resources (CPRs).67 IoT security has been equated 
to a CPR problem,68 and if true, Ostrom’s principles69 may prove helpful in 
making predictions about the governance of various regimes under differing 
scenarios. These include the importance of: (1) “clearly defined boundaries for 
the user pool . . . and the resource domain”;70 (2) “[p]roportional equivalence 
between benefits and costs”;71 (3) “[c]ollective choice arrangements” ensuring 
“that the resource users participate in setting . . . rules”;72 (4) 
“[m]onitoring . . . by the appropriators or by their agents”;73 (5) “[g]raduated 
 
 63. Scott J. Shackelford, The Law of Cyber Peace, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2017) (citing Michael D. 
McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex 
Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 169, 171–72 (2011) (“Polycentricity is a system of governance in which 
authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under 
which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well 
as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes.”). 
 64. Id. (quoting Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action 
Problems 1 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Pol. Theory and Pol’y Analysis & Ariz. State Univ. Ctr. for the Study of 
Inst. Diversity, Working Paper No. 08-6, 2008), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/ 
10535/4417/W08-6_Ostrom_DLC.pdf?sequence=1). 
 65. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 35 (Dev. & Econ. Rsch. Grp., 
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ 
bitstream/handle/10986/9034/WPS5095_WDR2010_0021.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 66. Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International Law on 
Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 47 (2016) 
(citing Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L 
ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998)). For a deeper dive on this topic, see chapter 2 of SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING 
CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE (2014). 
 67. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 90 (1990); see also SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (1998). 
 68. See Isaac Kohen, Why IoT Device Security Is a Common Pool Resource, IOT WORLD TODAY (Apr. 9, 
2018), https://www.iotworldtoday.com/2018/04/09/why-iot-device-security-common-pool-resource/. 
 69. See Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic 
Systems, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 8, 2009), in 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 653 (2010).  
 70. BUCK, supra note 67, at 32. 
 71. Ostrom, supra note 64, at 13. 
 72. BUCK, supra note 67, at 32. 
 73. Id. 
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sanctions” for rule violators;74 (6) “[c]onflict-resolution mechanisms [that] are 
readily available, low cost, and legitimate”;75 (7) “[m]inimal recognition of 
rights to organize”;76 and (8) “governance activities [being] organized in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises.”77  
It should be apparent that not all of Professor Ostrom’s design principles 
are equally applicable in the IoT context. For example, boundaries in the IoT 
context are relatively fluid depending on the governance level at issue, and thus 
may be difficult to draw and enforce.78 Another instance is Professor Ostrom’s 
third design principle, which states “that most of the individuals affected by a 
resource regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying the rules 
related to boundaries, assessment of costs . . . etc.”79 This principle calls for 
proactive rulemaking by various stakeholders, including technical 
communities.80 The history of Internet governance has been marked by such a 
multi-stakeholder approach to governance, as is discussed further in Part IV. 
Moreover, this principle recognizes the need for dynamic rules that keep pace 
with a changing regulatory and technological environment.81 One example of 
this practice being manifest has been the rollout and wide adoption of the NIST 
CSF, which is helping to establish a baseline of cybersecurity due diligence from 
the bottom up both in the United States and around the world.82  
Other theorists have also pioneered work relevant to this discussion, which 
has been discussed at length in previous works but is worth introducing here.83 
Professor Yochai Benkler, for example, conceptualized a three-layer structure 
of cyberspace, including: (1) the “physical infrastructure,” including the routers 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity of Organizations, in 
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MECHANISMS 105, 118 tbl.5.3 (Eric Brousseau, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Pierre-André Jouvet & Marc Willinger 
eds., 2012). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE 
ENVIRONMENT 164 (2007) (explaining how members of micro-communities tend to focus only on what directly 
impacts their own activities). 
 79. Ostrom, supra note 76, at 120. 
 80. See George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 641, 656–57 (2010) (discussing the origins of the proactive law movement, which may be considered “a 
future-oriented approach to law placing an emphasis on legal knowledge to be applied before things go wrong” 
(quoting NORDIC SCHOOL OF PROACTIVE LAW, http://www.juridicum.su.se/proactivelaw/main/)). 
 81. Ostrom, supra note 76, at 120. 
 82. See Scott J. Shackelford, Andrew A. Proia, Brenton Martell & Amanda N. Craig, Toward a Global 
Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on 
Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 309–10 
(2015); Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell, & Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms Up: A Comparison of “Voluntary” 
Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217, 219, 222–23 (2016) [hereinafter Shackelford et al., 
Bottoms Up]. 
 83. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyber Attacks Through Polycentric 
Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273 (2013) (discussing the different governance models proposed by theorists 
and their security implications).  
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and smart devices that comprise the physical aspect of cyberspace and IoT; (2) 
the “logical infrastructure,” including the TCP/IP protocol; and (3) the “content 
layer,” which incorporates data and, indirectly, users.84 This model is similar to 
Professor Lawrence Lessig’s model from his 1999 book on how code becomes 
law,85 which also advocated for protecting openness and “decentralized 
innovation.”86 However, Professor Andrew Murray has criticized this approach 
as being too “idealistic,” stating that “the harnessing of one regulatory modality 
through the application of another is more likely to lead to further regulatory 
competition, due to the complexity of the network environment.”87 Instead of a 
single approach, though, Professor Lessig identified four modalities of cyber 
regulation: architecture, law, the market, and norms that “may be used 
individually or collectively” by policymakers seeking to enhance IoT security.88 
The following Part digs more deeply into how two principal cyber 
powers—the United States and the EU—have leveraged these modalities to 
address latent IoT insecurity. As will be apparent, despite having much in 
common, these two jurisdictions have addressed IoT governance quite 
differently, with the EU preferring a more comprehensive, regulatory approach 
as compared to the more sector-specific, standards-based U.S. approach. Still, 
both regimes have similarities, which can be leveraged to help build momentum 
toward new international cybersecurity due diligence norms focused on securing 
smart devices. 
II.  U.S. CASE STUDY 
The United States, long a pioneer in Internet technologies and their 
application, has increasingly focused on the promise and peril of IoT 
technologies, including the ways in which they could be leveraged for politically 
motivated hacking. This Part unpacks the current U.S. regulatory framework 
pertaining to IoT devices before moving to analyze reform efforts at the state 
and federal levels. We then discuss the utility of cybersecurity frameworks and 
standards, focusing on those published by NIST and Consumer Reports, to better 
understand whether these various modalities will be sufficient at helping to fill 
prevailing governance gaps. 
 
 84. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structure of Regulation Toward 
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 561, 562 (2000). 
 85. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY 160 (2004) (describing “the interaction between architecture and law” in the context of copyright 
regulation). 
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(2002). 
 87. MURRAY, supra note 78, at 46 (“It is highly unlikely that content producers, media corporations and 
other copyright holders will allow for a neutral system designed to protect cultural property and creativity at the 
cost of loss of control over their products.”). 
 88. Id. at 28.  
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A.  FEDERAL REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
As stated above, the United States has favored a generally voluntary, 
sector-specific or topic-specific approach to both cybersecurity and data privacy. 
This is unlike the mandatory and comprehensive approach, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), enacted in May 2018 in the EU, which came into 
force in May 2018.89 In short, not all private data is created equal in the United 
States: it matters whether it is health or financial data, or your IP address or 
Internet searches (at least outside of California).90 The latter, for example, are 
safeguarded by GDPR as personal data for EU citizens, but U.S. citizens do not 
enjoy similar protections.91 Similarly, cybersecurity regulation in the United 
States—particularly in the IoT context—includes a patchwork of federal and 
state laws and policies, which are summarized below and compared in Part III 
to the EU.92 In general, though, such protections are more robust in Europe than 
in the United States, ranging from heightened requirements to disclose cyber 
attacks to national authorities, cyber attack post-mortem requirements and 
requirements to appoint a Data Protection Officer to enhanced consent 
requirements, as discussed further below.93 Such standards would not protect 
against all incidents of sophisticated foreign states targeting vulnerable 
networks, but they do help to raise the overall level of cybersecurity due 
diligence, as is discussed further in Part IV.  
Due to both the scope and complexity inherent in the IoT, federal 
cybersecurity law has so far not been up to the task of mitigating security 
problems arising in this context.94 Governance gaps remain common, despite the 
best efforts by groups such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which 
encourages, but does not require, firms to: 
1. [B]uild security into devices at the outset, rather than as an afterthought in 
the design process; 
2. [T]rain employees about the importance of security, and ensure that 
security is managed at an appropriate level in the organization; 
 
 89. See, e.g., Meghna Chakrabarti, Overhauling Digital Privacy in the EU, NPR: ON POINT, 
http://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2018/04/24/eu-gdpr-facebook-digital-privacy (Apr. 24, 2018). 
 90. See David Zetoony, CCPA Privacy and Security FAQs: If a Company Receives a Right to Be Forgotten 
Request, Does It Have to Delete the Requestor’s IP Address from Its Weblogs?, JD SUPRA (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ccpa-privacy-and-security-faqs-if-a-28543/ (explaining that it is an open 
question whether IP addresses are indeed covered). 
 91. See What Is Personal Data?, EU GDPR COMPLIANT, https://eugdprcompliant.com/personal-data/ (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 92. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELS.  (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt Best Practices to Address Consumer 
Privacy and Security Risks, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/01/ftc-report-internet-things-urges-companies-adopt-best-practices. 
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3. [E]nsure that when outside service providers are hired, that those providers 
are capable of maintaining reasonable security, and provide reasonable 
oversight of the providers; 
4. [W]hen a security risk is identified, consider a “defense-in-depth” strategy 
whereby multiple layers of security may be used to defend against a 
particular risk; 
5. [C]onsider measures to keep unauthorized users from accessing a 
consumer’s device, data, or personal information stored on the network; 
6. [M]onitor connected devices throughout their expected life cycle, and 
where feasible, provide security patches to cover known risks.95 
In sum, the FTC recommends “tackling data security and all consumer-
facing software development efforts with a holistic approach that incorporates a 
‘privacy by design’ strategy to address the entire life cycle of data collection, 
use, access, storage and ultimately secure data deletion.”96 These suggestions 
are in line with both the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the 2015 
NIST IoT Framework discussed next. They help to address the problem of 
politically motivated cyber attacks on IoT networks because they help to raise 
the overall level of cybersecurity due diligence, including for defense 
contractors, promoting defense-in-depth. 97 
The FTC has authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act to protect consumers from “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”98 Over 
time, the FTC has engaged in enforcement actions against firms with inadequate 
cybersecurity safeguards, particularly those operating in a critical infrastructure 
context. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the FTC’s 
authority to regulate cybersecurity in 2015.99 However, based on a more recent 
case, LabMD Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,100 the FTC is being pushed to 
become more specific with regards to the cybersecurity standards it requires of 
covered U.S. businesses. In essence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, to be consistent with the reference to the Third Circuit, ruled in June 
2018 that, since the FTC had not provided specific cybersecurity standards 
 
 95. Id. 
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799 F.3d 236, 259 (3d Cir. 2015).  
 100. LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 678 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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defining reasonableness for LabMD, a now bankrupt cancer-screening 
company, the FTC’s order was illegal.101 
While not challenging the FTC’s authority to police cybersecurity, the 
court did significantly tighten the grounds over which the FTC could initiate 
investigations and levy fines and settlement orders. Specifically, the underlying 
data breach must violate some specific law such as the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA).102 Thus, the FTC cannot 
penalize a company for the release of data causing a substantial consumer injury 
if it is not subject to an existing law. The Eleventh Circuit did not address 
whether the FTC’s use of the negligence tort sufficed in this case. The FTC 
argued that “its enforcement action was grounded in the common law of 
negligence because LabMD unintentionally allowed the invasion of its 
customers’ privacy.”103 To be clear, even though the Eleventh Circuit did not 
rule on that question here, a consumer harmed would still be able to seek 
damages under a negligence cause of action in common law, though that comes 
with its own challenges such as the economic loss doctrine.104 In addition, 
depending on where the person resides there could also be the option of state-
level relief. For example, California’s 2018 Consumer Privacy Act, now in 
effect, is promoting higher standards for data use transparency.105 It does not go 
as far as the EU’s GDPR discussed in Part III, but it does include provisions that 
allow consumers to sue in the aftermath of data breaches including in the IoT 
context.106 Moreover, as of January 2020, under California Senate Bill 327, “any 
manufacturer of a device that connects ‘directly or indirectly’ to the Internet 
must equip it with ‘reasonable’ security features, designed to prevent 
unauthorized access, modification, or information disclosure.”107 Yet these laws 
do little to regulate the importation of insecure IoT products from overseas, 
 
 101. Alison Frankel, There’s a Big Problem for the FTC Lurking in the 11th Circuit’s LabMD Data-Security 
Ruling, REUTERS (June 7, 2018, 1:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-labmd/theres-a-big-problem-
for-the-ftc-lurking-in-11th-circuits-labmd-data-security-ruling-idUSKCN1J32S2. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine in the 
Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935, 936–38 (2016). 
 105. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1 (2018); see also Devin 
Coldewey, The California Consumer Privacy Act Officially Takes Effect Today, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 1, 2020, 
6:01 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/01/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-officially-takes-effect-
today/. 
 106. See Ben Adler, California Passes Strict Internet Privacy Law with Implications for the Country, NPR 
(June 29, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624336039/california-passes-strict-internet-
privacy-law-with-implications-for-the-country.  
 107. Adi Robertson, California Just Became the First State with an Internet of Things Cybersecurity Law, 
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which if enacted still would admittedly pose extraterritorial concerns of the kind 
surrounding GDPR discussed below. 
There currently seems to be a growing circuit split over the FTC’s 
cybersecurity oversight powers focusing on the Third and Eleventh Circuits, 
which could result in a state of affairs (unless Congress intervenes) in which no 
U.S. federal government agency can penalize a company simply for having lax 
cybersecurity unless it runs afoul of existing sector-specific statutory 
prohibitions.108 Yet that does not mean that states could not act, as the California 
example demonstrates, along with new public-private partnerships as called for 
by applying the Ostrom Design Principles discussed further in Part IV.  
B.  ANALYZING THE NIST CSF 
After being unable to convince Congress to pass comprehensive 
cybersecurity reform legislation, the Obama administration instead decided on 
an approach to nudge U.S. critical infrastructure toward greater cybersecurity 
due diligence.109 The result was the first 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
(NIST CSF), which is critical since—even though it has been criticized as 
leading to a reactive stance110—it is promoting a baseline standard of care.111 
The NIST CSF is designed to “help organizations identify, implement, and 
improve cybersecurity practices, and create[] a common language for internal 
and external communication of cybersecurity issues.”112 The first NIST CSF was 
published in 2014,113 and not too long thereafter it became established as an 
important data point for defining a “standard” for “due diligence.”114 
Reminiscent of GDPR, the NIST CSF is also having a worldwide impact given 
active NIST collaborations with more than twenty nations.115 Version 1.1 of the 
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NIST CSF was published in 2018,116 which “boasts . . . improvements” in the 
areas of “authentication, supply chain cybersecurity, and vulnerability 
disclosure.”117 IoT has largely been left to the margins, which is a topic that 
NIST is gearing up to address in more detail.  
C.  CASE FOR A NIST IOT FRAMEWORK 
NIST put out a draft IoT Cybersecurity Baseline and is gathering feedback 
on it as of this writing.118 Such a Baseline could be supplemented by the 2019 
NIST Privacy Framework, which takes a similar approach to the NIST CSF as a 
“tool developed in collaboration with stakeholders intended to help 
organizations identify and manage privacy risk to build innovative products and 
services while protecting individuals’ privacy.”119 Legislation that is currently 
pending as of this writing, namely the IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 
2019 discussed next, would require NIST to finalize this process in collaboration 
with the Office of Management and Budget. 
D.  UNPACKING THE PROPOSED FEDERAL IOT LEGISLATION 
Another path forward aside from bottom-up cybersecurity and data privacy 
frameworks facilitated by NIST is to rely more specifically on legislation to do 
what, thus far, standards have failed to deliver, building on recent developments 
of states like California. Senators Mark Warner, Cory Gardner, Ron Wyden, and 
Steve Daines introduced the Internet of Things Cybersecurity Act of 2017 with 
this aim in mind.120 In essence, the legislation would leverage U.S. government 
procurement to only purchase products that: (1) “are patchable,” (2) do not 
“contain known vulnerabilities,” (3) “rely on standard protocols,” and (4) they 
“don’t contain hard-coded passwords.”121 Rather than a one-size-fits-all 
approach to regulating IoT, the authors provide a mechanism allowing industry 
to take up “equivalent, or more rigorous, device security requirements” than 
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and Professor Jonathan Zittrain,123 but it also has its critics.124 Unfortunately, the 
bill died, due in large part to industry resistance,125 leading one to consider 
alternatives. Indeed, other bills have also been addressed in Congress designed 
to improve IoT security, including the IoT Consumer TIPS Act of 2017, which 
is aimed at helping the FTC boost consumer cyber hygiene, as well as the 
SMART IoT Act, which would mandate that the U.S. Department of Commerce 
“conduct a study on the state of the industry.”126 In 2019, the IoT Cybersecurity 
Improvement Act of 2019 was introduced by Senator Mark Warner, which 
would require NIST and the OMB to establish new IoT cybersecurity guidelines 
for federal agencies.127 
E.  CIVIL SOCIETY 
Rather than strict regulations, many industry groups prefer self-regulation 
“to [better] adapt to rapid technological progress.”128 In some circumstances, 
such efforts can be more cost effective than command and control-style 
regulation,129 though it is not a panacea given that such efforts are voluntary and 
subject to market forces (for example, consumer demands), which is why 
communal self-governance is but one element of polycentric governance 
discussed in Part III.130 One organization that is trying to create such a 
community is Consumer Reports through its Digital Standard, which was 
launched in 2017 and is designed “to measure the privacy and security of 
products, apps, and services . . . [to] put consumers in the driver’s seat as the 
digital marketplace evolves.”131 The goal of the effort is to inform and empower 
consumers to make better decisions about the types of products and services 
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based on privacy and security features, rewarding firms that make those 
attributes central components of their business models.132  
As the Digital Standard is refined, it may well help shape global IoT 
governance.133 Already, Consumer Reports is working with European 
colleagues to harmonize its Digital Standard, which could lead to further norm 
building efforts around cybersecurity due diligence in the IoT context as is 
discussed in Part IV.134 However, obstacles remain in this context given the 
diverging regulatory stances of the United States and the EU when it comes to 
IoT governance, as is further explored in the analysis accompanying Table 1.135 
III.  E.U. CASE STUDY 
The EU has long taken a more comprehensive approach to both 
cybersecurity and data privacy than the United States, which is now playing out 
in the IoT context.136 For example, in late 2015 the European Commission 
launched Horizon 2020, which included goals for smart cities and IoT 
deployment,137 with plans to secure the full range of IoT devices by extending 
product liability.138 Indeed, even though there have not yet been sweeping 
changes to the IoT regulatory landscape, it is worth noting that France has 
extended the EU’s Product Liability Directive to include IoT, making it the 
first—but likely not the last—EU Member State to take this step.139 There has 
been a push to finalize the EU’s ePrivacy Regulation, which is set to replace the 
2002 ePrivacy Directive and will accompany and in some ways reinforce GDPR, 
but industry resistance has meant that as of this writing the Regulation remains 
in draft form.140 The Netherlands’ Radiocommunication Agency has also 
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supported expanding the European CE mark, which already applies to some 
twenty product groups such as appliance and toys, to include privacy and 
security benchmarks alongside safety, health, and environmental sustainability, 
but this proposal has similarly not yet been acted upon as of this writing.141 
A.  GDPR’S APPLICATION TO IOT SECURITY 
One of the main ways that the EU will shape IoT governance is through 
GDPR, which is an expansive regulatory regime featuring a wide array of 
requirements on covered entities such as data portability and the right to be 
forgotten.142 An important aspect is GDPR’s push for covered entities to create 
codes of conduct as an affirmative defense against regulatory action, an example 
that Australia has followed with its new Code of Practice for the Manufacture of 
IoT Devices.143 Yet these regulations were not drafted with IoT in mind, despite 
a 2017 finding by the European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA) “that there were no ‘legal guidelines for IoT device and 
service trust.’ Nor any ‘level zero defined for the security and privacy of 
connected and smart devices.’”144 Future European-level data protection 
regulation takes time—GDPR took more than four years to be adopted after first 
being proposed, meaning that relying on this same process to boost IoT security 
could prove problematic.145 However, nations can go further than the EU as an 
organization. For example, the UK has also been active in developing 
cybersecurity standards, which is the illustrative example we turn to next. Such 
national case studies are important since the NIS Directive gives wide latitude 
to EU Member States to develop cybersecurity standards for critical 
infrastructure, and relatedly IoT. 
B.  NATIONAL CASE STUDY: UNITED KINGDOM & BREXIT 
The UK has sought to secure critical infrastructure and in so doing help 
operationalize the NIS Directive through the development of IoT standards, a 
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process which began with the 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy.146 However, 
the 2011 Strategy did not specifically address IoT security.147 As such, it was 
revised in 2014 to create the Cyber Essentials Certification Program,148 which 
has the goal of “incentivis[ing] widespread adoption of basic security controls 
that will help to protect organisations against the commonest kind of Internet 
attacks.”149 Specifically, the Cyber Essentials Certification calls on businesses 
to follow the British government’s Ten Steps to Cyber Security, which is 
reminiscent of the FTC’s Guide for Business discussed in Part II.150 The more 
recent 2016 UK National Cybersecurity Strategy moves forward on some of 
these issues, but only references IoT issues in passing.151 Still, the Cyber 
Essentials Program has produced a following, and as a result has helped 
businesses across the country market cybersecurity as a competitive advantage, 
instead of merely a cost of doing business.152 The British government has also 
made its Cyber Essentials Certification mandatory for all public-sector 
contractors handling PII.153 Moreover, it has also announced plans to require 
applications geared for children to have built-in privacy protections.154 
In short, Britain’s Cyber Essentials effort is intended as supplementation 
of existing organizational approaches to risk management, but with plans for a 
mandatory IoT labeling scheme.155 To that end, the IoT Security Foundation 
(IoTSF) has worked with IASME to create the IASME BASIC IoT Security 
Scheme, which aligns with and expands upon the Cyber Essentials Program. 
Beginning in April 2020, IASME has been chosen by the National Cyber 
Security Centre to be the sole Cyber Essentials Scheme Accreditation body for 
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the UK.156 Relatedly, the UK has taken steps to clarify IoT labeling for 
consumers and manufacturers in an effort led by its Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport.157 More recently, the UK government introduced 
legislation “to hold firms manufacturing and stocking Internet-connected 
devices to account to stop hackers threatening people’s privacy and safety.”158 
The legislation includes the prohibition of default passwords for IoT devices.159 
These developments place the UK as a unique success story of public-private 
collaboration in IoT security and highlights the different track it has taken from 
France, a division that may widen post-Brexit.160  
It remains unclear, however, what impact Brexit will have on the UK’s 
cybersecurity efforts generally, as well as IoT cybersecurity in particular. For 
example, the UK has taken the affirmative step of codifying GDPR into its 
domestic legislation through its Data Protection Act of 2018, which will 
presumably stay in effect regardless of the final Brexit settlement.161 However, 
it is unclear whether or not the UK will continue to incorporate future updates 
or GDPR revisions into its domestic law, potentially placing British firms at a 
disadvantage to continental peers. If it voluntarily leaves, or is involuntarily 
thrown out, then it could place new barriers to British firms seeking to operate 
in the EU in the areas of creative content production, data protection, copyright, 
and e-commerce.162 Related questions remain unanswered about Britain’s post-
Brexit participation in law enforcement collaborations like Europol, along with 
the impact on the EU if Britain limited its intelligence sharing with EU allies 
given its special position as a member of the Five Eyes.163 IoT presents 
especially problematic issues given the broad ecosystem of devices and 
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networks in question that often span national boundaries. If the UK is not part 
of broader EU efforts to develop IoT certifications and trustmarks, along with 
not employing updated versions of GDPR and the NIS Directive, it could further 
isolate British tech firms from finding new markets for their IoT products and 
services.  
C.  SUMMARY 
The foregoing analysis highlights the disparity of approaches to IoT 
governance generally and security in particular that are being attempted in the 
United States and EU. The EU, for example, seems to be mirroring its approach 
to data privacy by moving in a direction of comprehensive regulation, 
particularly if more EU Member States follow France’s lead in extending 
products liability to include IoT. The United States, on the other hand, is 
maintaining a largely voluntary, sector-specific approach to IoT security and 
privacy, though as leading states such as California enact new protections that 
might begin to change. The UK, perhaps in particular post-Brexit, seems to be 
positioning itself as a middle ground between these two bottom-up and top-down 
extremes, as exemplified in its Cyber Essentials Plus Certification public-private 
program and IoT security mandates. Still, such disparity makes it challenging 
for IoT firms with global ambitions to navigate between these competing 
regulatory schemes. 
These results may be summarized in terms of an IoT governance spectrum, 
attempted in Figure 1 below, which is unpacked in Part IV. States with a 
relatively low degree of state involvement in IoT governance are positioned at 
the left side of this spectrum, with states—particularly those like France that 
now treat IoT as a component of products liability—on the right side.  
 
Figure 1: IoT Governance Spectrum 
 
 
Included within this governance spectrum is an array of different policy 
options that are being pursued in the transatlantic context, to say nothing of 
efforts underway across other cyber powers in Asia and beyond.164 These 
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include a spate of options described in Parts II and III ranging from safe harbors 
in Ohio to trustmarks in the EU, which are in turn summarized in Table 1.  
 






Safe Harbor Incentivizing businesses to “develop and maintain a 
cybersecurity program that ‘reasonably conforms’ 
to an already existing, industry recognized 




“[A]ny manufacturer of a device that connects 
‘directly or indirectly’ to the Internet must equip it 
with ‘reasonable’ security features, designed to 





“Given the frequency, magnitude and cost of 
cybersecurity incidents, the Commission believes 
that it is critical that public companies take all 
required actions to inform investors about material 
cybersecurity risks and incidents in a timely 
fashion, including those companies that are subject 
to material cybersecurity risks but may not yet have 





Data Privacy & 
Codes of 
Conduct 
Incentivizes firms to develop industry codes of 
conduct to consider the wider risk of cyber threats 





Focusing on consumers by informing them of the 





Treating breaches related to IoT products under a 
strict liability standard. 
France 
 
What mix of these approaches might make sense in a given context will be 
dependent upon the unique legal traditions and cultures of different jurisdictions. 
Thus, while there is certainly a place for benchmarks—such as the ability to 
update software for IoT devices—adequate room should also be made for 
bottom up experimentation and innovation, as we argue further in Part IV. 
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This final Part reviews the policy implications revealed by the governance 
gaps highlighted above. First, we review what lessons can be learned from how 
the Internet itself evolved. Governance best practices are, in turn, analyzed and 
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applied to IoT. Second, we import these lessons as to the relative benefits of 
bottom-up and top-down approaches to managing an array of IoT governance 
challenges exemplified in Figure 1 to the field of cybersecurity due diligence in 
an effort to harden the emerging Internet of Things against nation-state attacks.  
A.  POLYCENTRIC INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The foregoing analysis paints a fragmented governance picture of the state 
of transatlantic IoT regulation. Indeed, given the pervasive types of devices, 
networks, and technologies that together comprise the Internet of Things, it is 
very unlikely that a unitary governance structure could or should be created to 
manage the myriad privacy and security threats faced within this context. 
Instead, as has been argued, a polycentric framework is useful in conceptualizing 
the state of IoT governance. This, in turn, helps to highlight gaps that may be 
taken advantage of by foreign national states and other adversaries. Table 2 
represents an effort to distill the various regimes analyzed throughout the 
Article, which are mapped in turn onto the Ostrom Design Principles introduced 
above. 
 
Table 2: Regime Effectiveness of IoT Governance Through the Lens of the 









Contested NIST CSF; FTC 
Guidelines 
Defined boundaries are 
problematic given the 
extent to which various 
smart devices from 
automobiles to 
thermostats, and even 
toasters, interconnect to 
form ecosystems. 
Fit to Local 
Conditions & 
Proportionality 
Fostered UK Cyber Essentials 
Plus Certificate; 
Digital Standard; 
Internet of Things 
Cybersecurity Act of 
2017 (proposed) 
The problem of 
proportionality is a 
frequent refrain in the 
cybersecurity context 
where few providers 
invest as much as they 
should in proactive 
cybersecurity measures 
because the full benefits 
of such investments are 
not realized by the firm. 
Collective-
Choice 
Fostered NIST CSF; Paris Call This principle implies 
the importance of 
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Arrangements engaged and proactive 
rulemaking by technical 
communities, the 
private sector, and the 
international 
community. 





According to Professor 
Ostrom, trust can 
typically only do so 
much to mitigate rule-
breaking behavior. 
Eventually, some level 
of monitoring becomes 
important. In self-
organized communities, 
typically monitors are 
chosen among the 
members to ensure “the 
conformance of others 
to local rules.”169 
Graduated 
Sanctions 
Fostered GDPR; 2018 
California Law; FTC 
Rule violations must not 
pass without notice or 















Present IETF; Consumer 
Reports; Information 
Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs) 
Underscores the extent 
to which multilevel, 
multi-stakeholder 
governance structures 




Although Table 2 does not represent a comprehensive analysis of the state 
of IoT governance and should only be considered among the first and certainly 
not the last word on how best to apply insights from the Ostrom Design 
Principles to this collective action problem, the analysis does reinforce several 
points that were raised throughout the paper. For example, it is clear that more 
needs to be done to clarify liability structures and, in so doing, simplify 
boundaries of responsibility within the Internet of Things. That is being done 
now in the EU, and to an extent in California as was discussed in Part II. 
Similarly, graduated sanctions need to be clarified, and enforced, across more 
jurisdictions. GDPR is a helpful step in this direction, as again is the 2018 
California laws mentioned above, but they must be complemented by efforts 
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from other G20 nations, as is discussed further below. Finally, public-private 
partnerships are needed to foster threat monitoring across these various networks 
and systems such as by taking advantage of successful nested entities like 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  
In all, Table 2 underscores the extent to which top-down, global 
governance of IoT security is neither likely nor optimal given the extent to which 
polycentric structures are needed to define, monitor, and enforce best practices. 
This will result, and indeed already has resulted, in regulatory competition 
between Washington, Sacramento, Brussels, and even Beijing, among other 
players, but that is nothing new in the cybersecurity or data privacy context. The 
trick is, and will remain, to manage these competitions in ways that help promote 
good governance overall, similar to how Ostrom uncovered the benefits of small 
and medium-sized governance units over top-down approaches such as in the 
case of metropolitan policing.170 Such insights not only have salience across 
domestic CPR contexts such as watersheds, but also online, as is explored next. 
B.  LOOKING BACK: APPLYING LESSONS FROM INTERNET GOVERNANCE TO IOT 
SECURITY 
The Internet has succeeded rather well in spite of the fact that only the 
period of time that the Internet had any Internet-specific governance is before it 
became the Internet–the pre-Internet ARPANET (before 1983)—and for a few 
years thereafter. During this time, ARPANET, and the overlapping NSFNET, 
were paid for and operated under contract with the U.S. government.171 But with 
the end of the government-run Internet backbone networks in the early 1990s 
and the rise of independent commercial Internet service providers came the end 
of an integrated governance structure. Instead, Internet service providers in the 
United States and elsewhere informally agreed to use the same set of technical 
standards and developed bilateral contracts between themselves.172 Together, 
these agreements and complementary technical standards are what enabled the 
Internet to scale to the ubiquity that it enjoys today. 
The Internet technical standards are a key part of the Internet’s success and 
the standards did start with U.S. government action. A decade after the first 
nodes of the ARPANET were interconnected in 1969, ARPA chartered a 
committee, the Internet Configuration Control Board (ICCB) to “guide the 
technical evolution of the [Internet] protocol suite.”173 After several 
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transformations the ICCB evolved into the IETF,174 which is currently the 
primary technical standards body for the Internet.175 The technical standards 
developed or maintained by the IETF are voluntary; the government does not 
mandate adherence to them but if an ISP or an equipment vendor does not 
support a core set of technical standards they would not be able to interoperate 
with the rest of the Internet. Proprietary standards for particular Internet 
applications do exist but their use is restricted to those systems that adopt the 
specific proprietary standards and even those systems must support the core set 
of technical standards in order for their communications to be transported over 
the Internet. 
Unlike the major telecommunications standards organizations such as the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), neither governments, nor their 
representatives, have any special role in the IETF standards development or 
approval. In addition, for more than two decades the IETF has been supported 
by meeting fees and the Internet Society and has not received direct support from 
any governments. Thus, the IETF is a fully independent international standards 
development organization, free from government influence, that creates 
standards that a rough consensus of IETF participants feel are technically 
sound.176 As such, it mirrors the Ostrom design principles highlighting the value 
of nested, empowered governance through engaged communities working at 
various scales.  
The IETF is currently working on IoT-related technical standards,177 
specifically including IoT security, but getting widespread adoption of the 
resulting standards will still be a challenge similar to the debate about how best 
to foster uptake of the NIST CSF. The IETF defines and maintains the standards 
for the technology that the Internet itself uses to transport information as well as 
the standards for the devices connecting to the Internet and the applications 
running on these devices and over the Internet. This technology includes 
security-enabling technology. As such, it plays an important role in Internet 
governance, which the United States and EU are working to augment. 
Over the years there have been many attempts to formalize Internet 
governance, such as granting a greater governance role to the ITU.178 But, to 
date, none of these efforts have succeeded, though there have been important 
milestones along the way such as the creation of the Internet Governance Forum 
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in 2006 and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s decision not to renew its 
contract with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) in 2016.179 However, taking the IETF as a model would argue that the 
United States voluntary security standards could be a successful path to security 
for the IoT, as opposed to the UK’s Cyber Essentials Plus Certificate Program. 
But there is a significant difference between the Internet’s voluntary technical 
standards and the voluntary security standards provided by NIST and others: a 
device that does not correctly implement the Internet technical standards will not 
be able to operate in the Internet, a strong forcing factor. On the other hand, a 
device that does not correctly implement security standards will interoperate, 
even though at a risk to the wider Internet ecosystem.180 Thus, voluntary 
technical standards, on their own, will likely not be sufficient when it comes to 
IoT security given the market failures discussed in Part I.  
C.  LOOKING AHEAD: OPERATIONALIZING CYBERSECURITY DUE DILIGENCE IN 
THE IOT CONTEXT 
At least two strategic paths forward can help firms, and the jurisdictions 
under which they operate, mitigate cyber risk in the IoT context. The first option 
is to further refine and operationalize the concept of cybersecurity due diligence, 
which is a general term used here in reference to enhancing the defense-in-depth 
utilizing multiple layers of protection of IoT devices along with the cyber 
hygiene of consumers. However, determining exactly what nations’ due 
diligence obligations are to secure IoT devices and to prosecute or extradite 
cyber attackers is no simple matter.181 A key aspect of this effort is effective 
information sharing; for example, government intelligence agencies cooperating 
with one another to detect such attacks and demonstrating a willingness to 
inform the targets. Without such information, the targets would often not even 
know if they were under attack, since few sophisticated attacks are detected,182 
and would not know that they needed to strengthen their defenses.  
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As we have seen, the United States and EU are taking different approaches 
toward IoT governance generally and increasing the responsibility for 
conducting cybersecurity due diligence by covered firms in particular. The 
United States has predominantly relied on a loose set of standards developed by 
NIST, IETF, and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), in collaboration with 
industry-specific groups, which are then (imperfectly and incompletely) 
enforced through FTC settlement orders. Yet recent developments—including 
California cybersecurity and privacy laws summarized above—will place new 
requirements on IoT manufacturers in a critical market that will likely cause 
many organizations to weigh whether it is worth designing specific products for 
California or making those standards the default. This process could be hastened 
by the growing uptake and popularity of the Consumer Reports Digital 
Standard, and mirrors the calculus that many, particularly in the United States, 
are having to undertake in considering how best to comply with GDPR.  
In the EU generally, and the UK in particular, we are also seeing a growing 
interest in mandatory certification schemes to enhance IoT security against a 
range of cyber threats.183 France might quicken this pace given its new approach 
to IoT product liability. As was shown, GDPR and the NIS Directive in 
particular are having an immediate impact on IoT manufacturers, which would 
only accelerate if the proposed French law shifting IoT liability is enacted (as 
with the pending IoT bills in Congress that were similarly summarized above). 
Eventually, such efforts could lead to greater harmonization, even a shared 
transatlantic approach to IoT security based around certain core fundamentals 
(such as banning hard-coded passwords, ensuring the ability to update devices, 
and enhancing consumer cyber hygiene) along with broader efforts to boost 
cybersecurity due diligence across the region. 
Progress has also been made on defining the international norms for 
cybersecurity due diligence. The G7 Declaration on Responsible States 
Behavior in Cyberspace, for example, maintains that “States should not 
knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using 
ICTs.”184 The UN Group of Governmental Experts has reiterated this norm.185 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 Rule 6 maintains, “[a] State must exercise due diligence 
in not allowing its territory, or territory or cyber infrastructure under its 
governmental control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights of, 
and produce serious adverse consequences for, other States.”186 Other 
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stakeholders, including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have also maintained that nations should not “use 
information and communications technologies and information and 
communications networks to carry out activities which run counter to the task 
of maintaining international peace and security.”187 Eventually, such 
harmonization could lead to new international agreements on the scope and 
meaning of cybersecurity due diligence. However, such a day remains distant at 
present given the extent to which such statements paper over significant 
differences in what exactly constitutes due diligence especially in the context of 
censorship and cyber sovereignty.188 
In general, then, there is a need for a polycentric approach to enhancing 
IoT cybersecurity to mitigate the risk of foreign nation-state cyber attacks on 
vulnerable devices and systems. At a foundational level, this includes securing 
the hardware and software supply chains on which these products are built.189 It 
is similarly vital to leverage market forces to reward companies that take security 
and privacy seriously, such as through the Digital Standard and insurance 
industry. There is also a role for governmental regulations to help speed the 
uptake of cybersecurity due diligence best practices, as is happening now in both 
the EU and in California. Over time, such national and regional efforts will help 
to crystallize a cybersecurity due diligence norm, particularly as it pertains to 
the protection of critical infrastructure, which is being made increasingly 
“smart” and thus vulnerable to foreign nation-state cyber attacks. All of these 
governance levels are components of an effort to practice “deterrence by denial” 
as an alternative to the threat of offensive counterstrikes, though in reality both 
are being practiced.190 Progress is being made at all of these governance levels, 
as has been discussed, including through the NIST CSF and EU’s GDPR in 
particular. Yet further efforts are needed, as was made evident when the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)191 surveyed IT 
professionals in the UK and found that “75 percent of the security experts polled 
say they do not believe device manufacturers are implementing sufficient 
security measures in IoT devices, and a further 73 percent say existing security 
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standards in the industry do not sufficiently address IoT specific security 
concerns.”192 
The international community has recognized the issues replete in the 
Internet of Everything. On November 12, 2018, French President Emmanuel 
Macron gave a speech at the Internet Governance Forum in Paris, announcing 
the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace—a high-level multi-
stakeholder statement of principles that did not necessarily break new ground in 
cyber norm building, but did crystallize several ongoing efforts including those 
mentioned above. In particular, the agreement calls for action to safeguard 
civilian infrastructure, promote Internet access, and make democracy harder to 
hack.193 On the day it was announced, more than fifty nations (with the notable 
exception of the United States), along with “more than 130 companies and 90 
universities and nongovernmental groups” signed the Paris Call.194 Even though 
the United States, China, and Russia did not sign the accord, a number of cyber 
powers did, including the UK and France, and as such it is a prime example of 
the type of polycentric action needed to harden IoT devices.195  
A number of trust-building steps should be taken on this journey. One final 
concrete idea that policymakers could consider is again pulled from the annals 
of Internet governance. In particular, “regional techs” were regular gatherings in 
which Internet architects got together to discuss operational issues and norms on 
the nascent Internet.196 Over time, these gatherings morphed into the North 
American Network Operators Group (NANOG).197 This might be a possible 
model for a technical-community-based group to develop operational standards 
and norms for the IoT governance and to supplement the existing ecosystem by 
providing a space for higher-level coordination. Such an iterative process, 
building on the success of initiatives like the NIST CSF, could prove helpful in 
clarifying questions of IoT governance and security, and ultimately encouraging 
more consumers—and requiring more manufacturers—to update their toasters 
and other IoT products. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the IoT matures, so far it looks set to follow a similar route as the early 
days of Internet governance, though on an even larger scale, spanning myriad 
sectors and industries, in spite of the limitations of voluntary technical standards 
discussed above. Polycentric IoT regimes can help keep pace with these 
technological and regulatory changes.198 This includes a mixture of standards—
including a NIST IoT-specific effort—along with civil society efforts such as 
the Digital Standard, and the use of corporate governance structures, such as 
sustainability, and international norms, including due diligence. This all-of-the-
above approach is vital to filling in governance gaps. As Professor Elinor 
Ostrom said, this is not a “keep it simple, stupid” response,199 but a multifaceted 
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